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Fivesets of questions puzzle observers of Japanese financial markets,
particularly from the U.S. viewpoint. They concern: the apparently low
corporate cost of capital, low real interest rates, high equity prices, high
land prices, and the rising real yen. The paper surveys writings on these
issues, in brief enough form that one can see how the questions fit together.
Topics covered include: the leverage of Japanese firms, dividend payout,
equity price/earnings ratios, corporate taxation, cross-ownership, land
price/rental ratios, speculative bubbles, the household saving rate,
international capital mobility, expected real appreciation of the yen, the
lower cost of financing investment internally and through "main bank"
relationships, and the move to a more market-oriented system as these
relationships break down.
Conclusions include: (1) the real interest rate in Japan may remain below
that in the United States, despite international arbitrage, (2) the main
relevant effect of the internationalization in Japan may have been to
accelerate the process whereby corporate finance becomes market-oriented, so
that (3) affiliated firms are losing the special privilege of borrowing at a
cheaper rate, while (4) unaffiliated firms are able to borrow more cheaply than
before, and (5) the increased availability of funds for asset-market arbitrage
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INTERNAL CORPORATE FINANCING ANDRELATIONSHIPBANKING, VS. THE
MARKETSYSTEM1
INTRODUCTION
The structure of Japanese financial markets and the behavior of
observed financial prices have raised a number of important
interrelated questions, in the minds of American observers among
others. The first set, of particular concern to American
businessmen, pertain to:
(1) the cost of caDital to JaDanese firing. Is it lower than the
cost of capital to U.S. and other firms? And if so, why? What are
the implications for the level of investment in Japan (and what are
the implications, if any, for the trade balance)? The cost of
capital is usually represented as a weighted average of the cost of
borrowing (measured, for example, by the real interest rate) and the
cost of equity financing (inferred, for example, from the ratio of
required corporate earnings to the price of equity). A major theme
of Meerschwam (1989), and for the conclusion of this paper as well,
is that this standard way of viewing the cost-of-capital question can
be misleading, or at least incomplete. But, for the moment, it does
serve to introduce the next two Japanese financial prices whose
behavior has raised puzzles.
(2) The Jaoanese interest rate. Is it lower than in the U.S. and
other industrialized countries, in real terms in particular? If so,
why?
(3) JaDanese eauitv Drices. Why are they so high relative, for
example, to earnings? Alternatively, why have they risen so much,
especially in recent years? One of a number of possible contributing2
explanations for high price/earnings ratios is number 2 above, a low
interest rate (used to discount expected future earnings or dividends
into current equity prices). Another is a high expected real growth
rate in the economy [raising expected future earnings relative to
observed current earnings). Because corporations hold land, yet
another of the contributing factors to high equity prices is high
Japanese land prices.
(4) JaDanese land Drices. Why are they so high relative, for
example, to rents? Alternatively, why have they risen so much in
recent years? The two contributing explanations given for high
equity prices apply equally here: a low interest rate [used to
discount expected future rents into current land prices] and a high
expected economic growth rate [raising expected future rents relative
to observed current rents]. A final question, which the paper shall
argue is intrinsically tied to the question of low Japanese interest
rates, relates to the exchange rate.
(5) The foreiqn exchanae value of the yen. Why is it so high, in
real terms? Alternatively, why has it increased so much over time?
What are the implications?
No single paper can hope to answer all these questions. Much is
written on the subject of Japanese financial markets every year. The
institutional details, as well as the market prices themselves,
change rapidly, by virtue of domestic financial deregulation and
innovation, international financial liberalization, and tax reform.
A goal of this paper is to survey the issues, including a variety of
recent contributions [many of them unpublished] to the study of one3
or another of the financial market prices enumerated above, in brief
enough form that one can see how the different questions fit
together.The survey does not purport to be exhaustive of the
literature, however.
Thereis a fundamental thread that winds through the issues, and it
is worth spelling it out here. The paper subscribes to the common
view that a low real interest rate and a high expected growth rate
are two major factors explaining high price/earnings ratios in the
stock market and high price/rental ratios in the land market in
Japan. One respect in which the paper deviates from conventional
views is in arguing that the Japanese real interest rate can remain
low despite high integration into international financial markets.
Even so, a major apparent puzzle that remains is to explain why
price/earnings and price/rental ratios were not just as high (or even
higher) in the past, when Japanese real interest rates were just as
low (or even lower) and Japanese growth rates were just as high (or —
- until1973 --evenhigher). The difficulty, in other words, is to
explain why price/earnings and price/rental ratios increased so much
in the 1980s.
The proposed answer is that in previous decades, and especially
prior to 1973, institutional aspects of the Japanese financial system
such as those discussed in I4eerschwam (1989) rendered the observed
interest rate in large part irrelevant for the pricing of assets such
as equities and land. This answer implies that anyone able to borrow
from a bank or government agency, at artificially low interest rates,
for the purpose of acquiring land or corporate equity, could have4
made"excess" profits; but not just anyone was abletodo so. Such
sources of funds were not available to the man—in—the—street, or even
tothe corporation—in—the—street. To those favored corporations who
did have access to such funds, such asmembersof the industrial
groupingsknown as keiretsu, the number of profitable investment
projects typically exceeded the supply of funds available.
The international financial liberalization that has taken place in
Japan over the last ten years has been important for many reasons,
not least because it forced the pace of domestic financial
liberalization. But it is possible that the primary effect of the
structural changes since the 1970s has not been to bring the level of
"the" cost of funds in Japan up to the level of the world real
interest rate as is conventionally suggested.1 Rather the Drimarv
effect has been to brina the cost of caDital facing a tvDical
affiliated Jaoanese firm or institutional investor down toward the
cost of caDital facina a favored keiretsu firm.2 This process has
included both the accumulation of a vast pool of savings ——
particularlyin the hands of institutional investors -—andthe
development of active bond and equity markets in which these funds
could be invested. The increase in the pool of funds available for
arbitrage purposes helps to explain the price increases in equity and
land markets in the l980s.
The paper begins with the issue of access to cheap borrowing,
shifts to a consideration of the equity markets (including such
issues as dividend—payout rates, P/E ratios, and corporate taxation),5
considersdomestic and international determinants of the real
interest rate, and concludes with a discussion of internal financing.
Measurement and accounting problems occur from the beginning, and
will be discussed as we proceed. But throughout, the paper attempts
to concentrate on those trends in financial prices that are so strong
that one cannot easily attribute them entirely to measurement
problems.
THE STANDARDWEIGHTED-AVERAGE MEASUREOF THE COST OF CAPITAL
Theclaimthat the cost of capital is lower in Japan, perhaps
giving Japanese firms an "unfair" advantage, arose with some American
businessmen in the early 1980s .Theoriginal statements3 are widely
considered to have been somewhat simplistic. But later versions are
more persuasive.4 A traditional measure of the cost of capital is a
weighted average of the cost of borrowing and the cost of equity:
=V rd+ (1-w) r., (1)
where rd is the cost of debt, r is the cost of equity, and w is the
relative weight of debt in total financing. Under this definition,
the claim can be broken down into some combination of the following
three possibilities: (a) the cost of borrowing is lower in Japan, (b)
the cost of equity is lower in Japan, or (C)theweight on debt-
financing (versus equity-financing) is higher in Japan. All three
statements contain some truth.56
Real interest rates
Nominal interest rates in Japan have been below those in the United
States continuously since 1977. Japanese inflation has also been
relatively low over this period, and it is of course the real
interest rate, not the nominal rate, that matters for investment. But
calculations using 10—year government bond yields suggest that
Japanese real interest rates have been below U.S. real rates
virtually continuously from 1967 to 1988. (See Chart 1.6.)
Bernheim and Shaven (1986) estimate that the Japanese real interest
rate on average lay below the U.S real rate during the period 1971-
82, although the difference was quite small for the long—term rates
(which presumably are the ones that matter for investment): 0.23,
0.30, or 0.93, depending whether expected inflation is estimated,
respectively, by the inflation rate over the preceding year, the
average ex post rate, or a simple ABIMA model.7
In the period 1982-84, the U.S. long-term real interest rate rose
substantially above that in Japan and other G—7 countries.8 This
differential is widely considered to have been the result of a U.S.
fiscal expansion (which was accommodated neither by monetary policy
nor by private saving in the United States), counterpoised to fiscal
contraction in Japan and some major European countries.9 Bernheiin
and Shoven put the U.S.-Japan long-term real interest differential,
on average for the period 1983—85, at 2.02.
The U.S.—Japan real interest differential has been smaller in the
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This differential, even if small, is still present however (anywhere
from 1/2 per cent to 3 per cent in mid-1989, depending on the
measure), and may still be a consequential factor. I would estimate
the 10—year real interest differential to be at least 0.8 per cent,
as of the end of August,1989.11 (We postpone until Section 4 the
question of how such a differential can persist despite the apparent
international integration of financial markets.)
The standard formula for the equity price/earnings ratio and the
price/rental ratio is
r—g, (2)
where r is the real interest rate used to discount expected future
earnings or rents to the present, and g is the expected growth rate
of earnings or rents, as the case may be. Often the best we can do
to get an idea of the expected growth rate of earnings or rents is
assume that they are equal to the expected growth rate of the
economy.12 If r —gwere a number like .02 in the world economy at
large (which admittedly may be too low), then the Japanese interest
rate would only have to be lower by .01 --orthe growth rate higher
by .01, for that matter -—toexplain a doubling of the
price/earnings ratio.13
Nevertheless, because the real interest differential is thought to
be rather small, with the exception of the early 1980s, those who
argue that the cost of capital is low in Japan and that this has
presented a problem for the "competitiveness" of U.S. industry ever
since 1973 (e.g., Krugman, Hatsopoulos, and Summers, 1988), tend not8
toemphasize the real interest rate. They choose, rather, to
emphasize the cost of equity financing and the relative weight of
debt versus equity in corporate financing. (We return to the role of
the real interest rate later, however.)
Leveraae (debt/eauitv ratios
In the past, Japanese corporations have had a much higher ratio of
debt to equity than U.S. corporations, that is, they have been much
more highly leveraged.(In terms of equation (1) earlier, the
debt/equity ratio is w/(i-v).) In the period 1970—72, for example,
debt/equity ratios in Japan were four times as high as in the United
States. This commonly—observed characteristic of the Japanese system
is one major reason why calculations often show that a lower overall
cost of capital in Japan than in the United States; equity-financing
is known to be more expensive than debt—financing in any market,
presumablybecause portfolio investorsdemand a higher expected
return on equity to compensate them for higherrisk.14
How have Japanese firms been able to rely so heavily on debt? As a
number of authors have pointed out, a particular debt/equity ratio
that would be very risky for a U.S. firm may have been less risky for
a Japanese firm. There are several reasons for this. (1) Much of the
borrowing, particularly for members of a keiretsu, was from the
firm's main bank. As has been pointed out elsewhere, a main bank
would not cut off lending in time of financial difficulty; to the
contrary it would do all it could to see the companythrough.15 (2)9
Until recently, all loans had to be collaterized. This certainly
reduced the risk from the viewpoint of the bank, which in turn helps
explain the reduced danger that bank lending (as well as the ability
to sell bonds) would dry up in time of difficulty.(3) It has been
suggested that such government policies as allowing the formation of
cartels in event of recession reduced the risk of financial
difficulty or bankruptcy.16 (4) It has also been suggested that the
practice of paying workers a substantial fraction of their
compensation in the form of twice—yearly bonuses that vary with the
success of the company acts as a sort of profit—sharing mechanism,
and again reduces the risk of bankruptcy.17
In any case, it is important to note that the seemingly robust
regularity that "Japanese firms are highly leveraged" now appears to
be a thing of the past. The debt/equity ratio fell throughout most
of the l970s and 1980s, and has by now fallen below the level in the
United States, as shown in the last two columns of Table 1 (from
French and Poterba])8 This reversal is due only in small part to
the increase in corporate leverage in the l980s that has generated so
much alarm in the United States, partly because of its association
with "junk bonds" and mergers and acquisitions. The reversal is due
primarily to the decline in Japan, which is in turn due, at least in
an arithmetic sense, to the soaring value of Japanese equities and to
decreased reliance on the main bank system [and also to the reduced
need for external financing of any sort after 1973]. Each of these
factors will be discussed below.10
EQUITY CAPITAL
The rate of return on eauitv: stock Drices and dividends
The third of the standard components of the overall cost of capital
is the cost of equity financing, r in the standard equation. It is
the most ambiguous of the components to measure. One approach has
been to use the realized market rate of return on equity, i.e., the
dividend/price ratio plus the rate of increase of equity prices.
Baldwin (1986) and Ando and Auerbach (1985) computed the overall
return to debt plus equity (in what are intended to be improvements
on the Hatsopoulos (1983) approach of omitting equity altogether on
the Japanese side of the calculation]. They both found little
evidence of a difference between Japan and the United States.19 Ando
and Auerbach (1985) found that the market rate of return to equity is
in fact much hiaher in Japan (13.6% for the median of their sample of
firms, versus 2.2% for the U.S. firms). Subsequently, on a much
larger sample of firms but with a similar methodology and time
period, Ando and Auerbach (1988) found that the overall rate of
return on capital was substantially lower in Japan than in the United
States after all.2°
Stockholders' realized rate of return on equity is in any case a
very noisy indicator of their ex ante expectations,however.21
Friend and Tokutsu (1987, p.317) pointed out that while realized
market rates of return on equity have been higher in Japan (over the
period 1962—1984] than in the United States, a reverse answer results11
if the dividend/price ratio is added to the rate of growth of
dividends [per share], rather than to the rate of growth of prices.
In the absence of a speculative bubble, stock prices can be thought
of either as the present discounted value of expected future
dividends or the present discounted value of expected future earnings
(as a proxy for the more correct Free Cash Flow22). In both the
United States and Japan the dividend payout rate (Div/E) is
substantially less than 1, which suggests that the expected rate of
growth of dividends is greater than the expected rate of growth of
earnings [properly averaged over the perhaps-distant future]. Many
rapidly—growing companies pay no dividends at all, for example, and
rather re—invest all earnings into highly-profitable projects. We
consider the subject of dividends first, and turn to earnings in the
next sub—section.
There has been no upward trend in Japanese dividends (per share]
over the last 20 years.23 This makes it especially difficult to
explain the high level of Japanese stock prices, if one follows the
common approach of choosing the present—discounted-value—of—future—
dividends formula and estimating expected dividends from actual
realized dividends. On the other hand, the observed high level of
prices relative to dividends would be perfectly understandable if the
increase in dividends were thought still to lie in the future. If
dividends are expected to grow at a constant rate from now on, then
the current dividend/price ratio should equal r. —gd,where r. is
the required rate of return on equity capital (presumably higher than
the real interest rate because of a risk premium] and gd is the12
expected growth rate of dividends. As of 1988, the dividend price
ratio was only .006 in Japan, as compared to .030 in the United
States [third and fourth columns of Table 1, from French and
Poterba]. If r. is assumed to be the same in the two countries, then
the current levels of stock prices make sense if and only if the
dividends are expected to grow at a rate 2.4 per cent faster in Japan
than in the United States.
Why should Japanese dividends grow rapidly in the future, given
that they have not done so in the past? We have no good theory of
how shareholders wish to receive the return on their equity
investment, i.e., in the form of dividends or capital gains [or of
how managers choose to pay dividends]. In a sufficiently abstract
(Modigliani—Miller) world the payout rate is indeterminate. On the
one hand, tax considerations point to postponing the payment of
dividends. On the other hand, the hypothesis that managers sometimes
use funds for purposes other than maximizing shareholder welfare
points to shareholders insisting on early payment of dividends. But
dividends do get paid, and one hypothesis is that some shareholders
like to receive quarterly checks for liquidity reasons. They could
instead sell some stock to generate cash, but there are transactions
costs to doing so. The ratio of retirees to working—age people is
close to a minimum in Japan now, and will soon begin to rise until,
by 2020, it will be the highest of the major industrialized
countries. It is entirely plausible that wealthy Japanese retirees
in the future will wish to receive high dividend payments on their
holdings. Thus it is not entirely implausible that the expected13
future growth rate of dividends in Japan should be almost as high as
the rate of return on capital, or that it should be 2.4 per cent
higher than the growth rate in the United States, notwithstanding the
dividend record of the past 20 years.
An alternative approach is to look at the amount of earnings the
firm is required to generate per unit of equity, that is, the inverse
of the price/earnings ratio. If one is trying to determine whether
the Japanese stock market may be overvalued, looking at earnings has
the advantage that they are tied directly to the productive capacity
of the economy, as opposed to dividends.24
Price—earninas ratios
The price/earnings ratio (like the price/dividend ratio] has been
observed to be higher in Japan than in the United States ever since
the early 1970s. Because this difference could be explained by a
lower discount rate in Japan, it is often the basis of arguments that
the cost of equity capital is lower in Japan. But the difference
could also have other explanations, such as a higher expected growth
rate in Japan. If a high growth rate were the complete explanation,
one would not want to attribute the high P/E ratios to a low discount
rate. (More broadly, one would not want to attribute the superior
performance of Japanese industry necessarily to a low cost of
capital.] The paper now turns to the subject of the high and
increasing PIE ratios in Japan, an important question in its own
right.Table 1
From Trench and Poterba (1989)
Price-Earnings Ratios, Dividend-Price Ratios (in Percent),
Foreign Equity Holdings (in Percent), andDebt-EquityRatios.












1970 9.0 18.6 3.9 3.3 4.9 3.7 1.63 .54
1971 13.5 18.7 3.9 2.9 5.2 3.6 2.13 .50
1972 23.3 19.3 2.4 2.5 4.5 4.0 2.23 .48
1973 13.9 12.3 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.3 1.38 .69
1974 16.5 7.9 2.7 5.0 3.2 4.5 1.44 1.04
1975 25.2 11.8 2.53.8 3.64.8 2.13 .78
1976 22.0 11.2 2.13.7 3.7 4.7 1.88 .72
197719.3 9.1 2.0 5.0 3.0 4.6 1.82 .85
197821.5 8.2 1.75.2 2.74.7 1.62 .91
197916.6 7.5 1.85.3 3.04.6 1.78 .83
198017.9 9.6 1.64.4 5.84.8 1.59 .64
198124.9 8.2 1.55.3 6.65.1 1.64 .76
1982 23.7 11.9 1.44.6 7.65.3 1.44 .70
198329.412.6 1.23.7 8.35.6 1.03 .62
198426.310.4 1.26.1 8.85.6 .93 .74
198529.415.4 1.23.4 7.45.9 .71 .66
1986 58.6 18.7 0.8 3.0 7.0 6.7 .45 .65
1987 50.6 14.1 0.8 3.2 5.3 7.0 .43 .71
1988 56.3 12.9 0.6 3.0 4.8 7.2 .36* .71*
Source: Entriesreflect values on last trading day of each year. Foreign
holdings of U.S. equity are from the Federal Reserve BoardFlow of Funds
tables.Foreign holdings of Japanese equity are from the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, with 1988 value estimated from monthly net sales data in Monthly
Statistics Retort. The debt-equity ratio is defined as the book value of debt
divided by the market value of equity. The debt-equity ratios for the U.S.
are from the Federal Reserve Board (1988). The debt-equity ratios for Japan
for 1970-75 are from Ando and Auerbach (1988). Ratios for 1976-87 are based
on the data for "All Industries" in Daiwa (1980, 1984, 1987, and 1988).
Starred values for 1988 are the authors' estimates.Table 2
From French and Poterba (1989)





Method 1. Method 2
Year PIE Factor P/E Factor Factor P/E Factor P/E
1975 25.2 0.784 19.8 0.98 .599 11.5 .905 17.2
1976 22.0 0.824 18.1 0.97 .655 11.6 .920 16.1
1977 19.3 0.797 15.4 0.97 .684 10.2 .926 13.7
1978 21.5 0.792 17.0 0.97 .704 11.7 .931 15.3
1979 16.6 0.778 12.9 0.97 .717 9.0 .935 11.7
1980 17.9 0.770 13.8 0.97 .755 10.1 .947 12.6
1981 24.9 0.764 19.0 0.97 .702 13.0 .932 17.1
1982 23.7 0.769 18.2 0.97 .700 12.4 .931 16.3
1983 29.4 0.795 23.4 0.97 .692 15.8 .936 21.1
1984 26.3 0.734 19.3 0.97 .711 13.3 .943 17.5
1985 29.4 0.694 20.4 0.97 .668 13.3 .924 18.2
1986 58.6 0.695 40.7 0.98 .624 24.8 .908 35.7
1987 50.4 0.665 33.5 0.97 .660 21.5 .920 29.8
1988 54.3 0.669 36.3 0.97* .660*23.2 .920*32.1
Source: Authors calculations described in the text. The unadjusted P/E ratio
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Some, such as Ando and Auerbach, have looked at the price—earnings
ratio because they are interested in the cost—of—capital question,
and they consider P/E to be inversely related to the required rate of
return r.. Others, such as French and Poterba (1989) and Lawler,
Loopesko and Dudey (1988) are interested in the price-earnings ratio
for its own sake. As shown in the first two columns of Table 1, the
reported price/earnings ratio for Japanese firms has been higher than
the P/E ratio in the United States ever since 1972, and reached 58.6,
three times as high as the U.S. level, in 1986. In the stock market
crash of October 1987, the decline in Japan was smaller and shorter-
lived, with the result that by the end of 1988 Japan's reported PIE
was more than four times that in the United States or the rest of the
world. (See Chart 2.)
Such an apparent discrepancy would be difficult to explain. If
earnings are expected to grow at rate g•, then the earnings/price
ratio should equal r -g..The end-1988 differential between
reported earnings/price ratios in the United States and Japan was .06
(=.078-.018]. The real growth rate of the Japanese economy averaged
1.56 per cent faster than the U.S. economy over 1980-88; there is no
particular reason to expect the real growth rate of the economy to
increase in the future, or to expect the growth rate of earnings to
be higher than the growth rate of GNP. Thus the rate of return on
capital r would have to be more than 4 percentage points lower than
in the United States to explain the difference in reported PIE
ratios. Such a finding would support the cost—of—capital-advantage
school, but seems too large to be plausible although the paper will15
argue below that some difference in real rates of return may remain
even in international financial markets that are perfectly
integrated].
French and Poterba (1989), Ando and Auerbach (1985, 1988), and
Lawler, Loopesko and Dudey (1988), all emphasize the importance of
correcting earnings for a number of measurement problems. Ando and
Auerbach (1985) focus on three distortions related to inflation:
depreciation accounting, inventory accounting, and accounting for
nominal liabilities (and assets). They find that correcting for
these distortions increases estimated earnings, and therefore reduces
the P/E ratio, for virtually all the Japanese firms in their sample,
while it has no systematic effect for the U.S. firms.25 The
principle apparent source of the effect is that the Japanese firms
rely more on debt than equity (see above), so the fact that inflation
reduces the real value of their outstanding liabilities is more
important for them.26 If this is indeed the source of the effect,
then the fact that the debt/equity ratio in Japan appears to have
fallen below that in the United States in 1986 (and that inflation
fell in both countries in the 1980s), suggests that the inflation
accounting may no longer be as important for the P/E comparison.
French and Poterba have some other corrections to make to reported
earnings and therefore P/E ratios. First is the point that earnings
reported by U.S. corporations include the profits of subsidiaries,
while those reported by Japanese firms do not (only actual dividends
received from subsidiaries), so their earnings look smaller. A
calculation to convert P/E ratios to what they would be if there were16
no cross-holding of corporate equity (which requires adjusting both
earnings, by removing intercorporate dividends, and share prices)
reduces the Japanese P/E ratio. In 1988 the adjustment is big enough
to reduce it from 54.3 to 36.3.
Second, reported Japanese earnings also look smaller because they
deduct (both on the firms' tax returns and on their financial
statements] generous allowances for special reserves for such
possible future contingencies as product returns, repairs, and
retirement benefits. But this effect is relatively small.
Third, Japanese firms often take greater depreciation allowances
which, like the previous two factors, works to reduc. reported
earnings. (Unlike U.S. firms, when a Japanese firm claims a high
depreciation allowance for tax purposes, it must do the same on its
income statement.) French and Poterba consider two alternate ways of
correcting for the difference in depreciation accounting. The effect
of all three corrections together is to reduce the 1988 P/E ratio
from 54.3 to either 23.2 or 32.1, depending on which depreciation
correction is used. Lawler, Loopesko and Dudey (1988, 24) make their
own adjustments for depreciation and consolidation of earnings, which
produce a very similar result. (See charts 2 and 3.) The analogous
downward adjustment in U.S. P/E ratios is much smaller. Overall,
these accounting differences in earnings explain about half of the
difference between Japanese and U.S. ratios. This still leaves
Japanese equities about twice as high as U.S. equities. Or, if our
interest is in the cost-of-capital question rather than in the is-
Japan's—market-too—high question, the correction still leaves17
Japanese earnings/price ratios at about half U.S. levels.
Oncewe get the corrected Japanese earnings/price ratio up to the
neighborhood of .04, it becomes slightly easier to explain the
differential vis-a-vis the United States (which is at .09 when
similarlyadjusted by French and Poterba). If, for example, the
expected rate of growth of earnings g• in Japan were 2 1/2 per cent
faster than in the U.S. and the required rate of return were 2 1/2
per cent lower, that would explain the differential. But if it is
true that the required rate of return is lower by, say 2 1/2 per
cent, what might be the source of this difference?
We consider in turn three possibilities: more favorable tax
treatment, a lower real interest rate, and internal financing that is
cheaper than the market interest rate. In the end, the paper will
favor the third explanation, especially for the period before
liberalization, together with the second explanation, especially for
the period since liberalization.27
Coruorate taxation
Corporate taxation is one of the respects in which the effective
cost of capital facing the firm can differ from the observed rate of
return on investment (whether as viewed by the equity investor or by
the firm itself 3:itis of course the -tax cost of capital that
should matter for investment decisions. It would presumably be more
convenient for any American businessman who wished to claim that
Japanese industry had an "unfair advantage" in the form of a low cost18
of capital, if the source of the advantage were more favorable tax
treatment by the Japanese government. In the past, the corporate
income tax rate in Japan has been much higher than in the United
States, especially after the more favorable U.S. tax treatment of
business adopted in 1981 (or even than in other countries such as the
United Kingdom, which cut its corporate tax rate in 1984).28 In
1985, the Japanese government raised 5.9 per cent of its tax revenue
from corporations, as compared to only 2.]. per cent in the United
States.29 This has made it difficult to claim a taxadvantage for
Japanese industry.30
Indeed, when Ando and Auerbach (1985) computed after-tax
earnings/price ratios and after—tax return-to—capital rates, they
found that "it is Japanese, not American, firms that are taxed more
heavily on their real incomes," (p.25). They registered two possible
qualifications. First, one would prefer to look at the marginal
effective tax rates that are relevant to the firm's decision whether
to invest, rather than the average tax rate; but they noted that such
measures were unavailable for Japan. Second, their calculations
apply to the unlevered firm, but a corporation derives tax advantages
from borrowing since interest payments are tax—deductible and one
might expect these advantages to be larger for Japanese firms (both
because they have had higher debt/equity ratios until recently and
because the corporate tax rate that they are deducting against is
higher]. But Ando and Auerbach compute an upper bound on this tax
advantage, and claim that it is very small. Thus they feel able to
"rule out" the claim that the corporate tax system gives Japanese19
firms a cost—of—capital advantage (p.37). Noguchi (1985), taking
into account the advantages of borrowing, also concludes that the tax
burden is higher on Japanese, not U.S., corporations.
Other authors have ascribed more importance to the tax advantages
of borrowing in Japan. Bernheim and Shoven (1986) disputed the
prevailing approach in public finance of presupposing that the (pre-
tax) real interest rate must be constant across countries, in light
of the observed failure of this condition. They first computed the
after-tax cost of capital under the 1980 tax codes, using the actual
interest rates and inflation rates that held on average for the 1970s
(which entails assuming a U.S.-Japan real interest differential of
1.5 per cent).
BernheimandShoven found a smaller tax wedge on capital in Japan
than the United States, with the result that the after-tax cost of
capital in Japan was negative.31 They attributed this result to the
greater importance of interest payments (tax—deductible, on a nominal
basis) in Japan. They then repeated the computations for 1985 tax
codes, using the actual interest and inflation rates for the early
1980s. Despite the adoption of accelerated depreciation allowances
in the U.S. tax code in 1981, the estimated U.S. cost of capital
rises substantially in the 1980s, as a result particularly of the
much higher real interest rate (5.0 per cent, as compared to 2.0 per
cent in the 1970s32). The real interest rate was higher in Japan as
well, but there remains a substantial difference in the after—tax
costs of capital in 1985 (5.48 for the U.S. versus 2.76 for Japan].
The central message of Bernheim and Shoven was that variation in real20
interest rates tend to dwarf variation in corporate tax laws as
determinants of the cost of capital. They included in this message
the changes in the 1986 tax reform (including the removal of the
investment tax credit that had been increased in 1981), which was
under debate at the time that they were writing. Fukao (1988, 339-
341) found a larger tax wedge (less negative] for Japan than the
United States during the period 1981-84, but found that the
combination of the 1986 U.S. tax reform and lower inflation rates
brought the post-1986 tax wedge in the United States very close to
that in Japan.
In December 1988, the Japanese Diet approved a tax reform which had
been long sought by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The reform,
among other things, cut the Japanese corporate tax rate from 42 per
cent33 to 37 1/2 per cent (with the full cut not effective until
1990). This leives the tax rate only slightly higher than the
current rates in the United States (34 per cent) or the United
Kingdom (35 per cent).34Shoven (1989) updates his calculations of
the effective tax rates on corporate investment. He finds that the
effective tax rate on investments in Japan is up sharply to 32 per
cent in 1988 (as compared to 5 per cent in 1980). Part of the reason
is the tax reform: in Shoven's calculations (unlike Ando and
Auerbach' S(1985)],the high averaae corporate tax rate in Japan
worked to reduce the effective marainal tax rate on new investment,
because it increased the value to the corporation of borrowing to
finance the investment and deducting the interest payments from its
taxable income. He thus estimates that the reduction in the average21
corporate tax rate in itself raised the effective tax rate 9
percentage points.
The major reason for the increase in the marginal effective tax
rate on investment is not the tax reform, however, but rather the
sharp decline in expected inflation relative to the l970s. (This
decline is estimated to have raised the effective tax rate by 23
percentage points]. The fall in the inflation rate in Japan (from 9%
in the 1970s to 1%) means that the favorable distortion caused by the
tax-deductibility of nominal interest payments is reduced. This
leaves the effective Japanese tax rate still somewhat below the U.S.
rate, which was at 41 per cent in 1988 (up from 29 per cent before
the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
It is possible that the moderate tax advantage that remains in
Shoven's numbers does not adequately take into account the downward
trend in the Japanese reliance on debt,35 and that by now little is
left of the Japanese tax advantage. Ando and Auerbach (1985, 1988)
dismissed the importance in this context of taxes altogether.36
Bernheim and Shoven (1986, p.3) concluded that "under prevailing tax
systems, differences in the cost of capital between countries are
largely attributable to differences in domestic credit market
conditions, rather than to taxes." Since the time that these two
papers were written, the difference in tax treatment between the two
countries has, if anything, narrowed.37 If the public finance
economists think that taxes are of at best second—order importance in
comparing the cost of capital between the U.S. and Japan (or that the
difference has, if anything, gone aaainst Japanesecorporations], why22
should international economists disagree?
Total stock market capitalization and the late—80s run-up
The empirical fact that dominates the study of Japan's stock market
is the tremendous run-Up in prices since 1970, especially in the
1980s. We have already discussed the level of stock prices when they
are compared to dividends, and when they are compared to earnings.
The same trend is evident when comparing total capitalization (price
times number of shares) in Japan to capitalization in the United
States.
The Japanese stock market capitalization is supposedly much larger
than the U.S. (44 per cent of the world vs. 29 per cent).38 But
market values need to be adjusted for double—counting that results
fromintercorporate share ownership. (Nearly 2/3 of corporate equity
in Japan is held by other corporations.) When French and Poterba
adjustthe Japanese market for cross-holdings, they find that it is
still smaller than the U.S.: 33 per cent of the world capitalization
versus 36 per cent for the U.S.. But the growth of the Japanese
market is still remarkable (a 68—fold increase since 1970).
French and Poterba observe that the 1986-88 run-up in the stock
market is similar when measured relative to GNP. Their computed
ratio of adjusted equity to GNP fluctuated between .14 and .33 during
the period 1970—85, and then rose sharply to .68 by 1988.
(Meanwhile, the U.S. ratio, though more than twice as high as the
Japanese ratio in the early l970s, was only .49 in 1988.)23
The only ratio where French and Poterba do not find potentially
explosive behavior is the ratio of equity prices to the replacement
cost of capital, that is, Tobin's Q. They do find that the Q ratio
in Japan increased about 35 per cent from 1973 to 1987, to .67 or .77
(depending on the method of calculating net equity outstanding). But
the United States ratio, at .71, is in about the same range. The
fact that the replacement cost of capital in Japan has increased
almost as much as stock market prices French and Poterba tentatively
attribute to the fact that land prices have almost doubled since 1983
(and the fact that companies hold a lot of land39). They thus
tentatively conclude that the puzzle as to why equity prices rose so
much in the 1980s may be the same as the puzzle why land prices rose
so much in the 1980s. (See comparison of stock prices and land
prices in major cities in Chart 5•)40
Land Drices
The soaring price of land in Japan is a major phenomenon in its own
right. In 1986 the price of land in Tokyo (for residential use) was
150 times the price in New York (16 times the price in London, 35
times in Paris, and 11 times in Munich).41 The unit cost of land for
the country overall was about 40 times as high.42 Thus the value of
all the land in Japan is several times as great as the value of all
the land in the (much larger) United States.43 A favorite "factoid,"
which is apparently true, is that the grounds of the Imperial Palace
in Tokyo, when evaluated at the land prices of the adjoining Otemachich.1 5
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The price of land, analogously to the price of equity, should equal
the present discounted value of future rents (in the absence of a
speculative bubble). If rents are expected to grow at rate gr, then
the price/rental ratio should be given by
Pl.d/rsnt=r-gr
Thus the same possible explanations arise for high land prices as
arise for high equity prices: a low discount rate r or a high growth
rate gr. Noguchi (1987, as described by Ito, 1989a) observes that
the price/rental ratio is much higher in Tokyo than in other major
world cities,45 and concludes that about half of the Japanese land
price is a speculative bubble, that the demand for land is based on a
self-confirming expectation of future capital gains. But Ito (1989a)
disagrees, arguing that Noguchi omits the possibility that
expectations of rising land prices could be correctly based on
fundamentals, because the relative price of land will increase in a
growing economy where the supply of land is fixed.46
In terms of the above equation, gr could be high. Ito shows in an
OverLapping Generations model where land is a substitutable factor of
production that if land is in fixed supply, its relative price will
increase, at a rate essentially given by the real growth rate of the
economy.47 Boone (1989) and Boone and Sachs (1989) argue similarly.
When we were considering equity prices, we used the real growth rate
of the economy as a guide to thinking about the likely growth rate of
earnings; so Ito's and Boone's argument does not give us a reason why25
land price/rental ratios in Japan should have increased so much over
the last 18 years. In the theory, with growth in the economy, the
price and rent should each rise proportionately. Instead, while land
and housing prices have sky—rocketed, the rental rate has remained
approximately constant in real terms. (See the last lines of Table
3). (The price/rental ratio for housing increased by 67 per cent
between 1970 and l987.48].49
SDeculative bubbles
There is always the possibility of a speculative bubble, to explain
the price of land, the price of equity, or both. It is sometimes
argued that special institutional features of the Japanese stock
market,5° such as the dominance of trading by the big four security
firms and administrative guidance by the Ministry of Finance, keep
prices artificially high. It is argued, for example, that such
features might explain why the Japanese market "was not allowed" to
fall as far in the crash of October 1987 as other countries'
markets.51 But financial economists have not yet been able to
construct good models of what gets speculative bubbles started, or
what causes them to collapse. We do not even have much idea whether
bubbles are more or less likely in perfectly competitive "efficient"
markets than in markets where trading is characterized by turnover
taxes, larger transactions costs, oligopolistic market—makers, or
government intervention.
It is possible that some short—term movements in financial markets26
represent speculative bubbles. But before we do anything so radical
as attributing the longer-term movement in Japan's equity and land
prices to a speculative bubble, we return to the possibility of a low
discount rate in Japan.
DETERMINANTSOFTHE REAL INTEREST RATE
If one thinks of the real interest rate as equilibrating the
various sources and uses of funds, then a low real interest rate
would be explained by some combination of four factors: a high
corporate saving rate net of investment, a high public saving rate, a
high household saving rate, or a high availability of savings from
abroad. Each factor probably has played a role at one time or
another.
We know that the government was a source of cheap capital for many
firms in the 1950s and 1960s, but that it went sharply into deficit
and became a big user of funds after 1973. The Ministry of Finance
took pains to cut the government budget deficit in the early l980s,
but the deficit has nevertheless been relatively high throughout the
post—1973 period, and thus cannot explain a low real interest rate
during this period.52 The corporate sector was in deficit in the
postwar period until the first oil shock. We know that the corporate
deficit has been sharply lower since then,53 as the result of a fall-
off in the previously—high level of investment (which helps explain
the extension of the period of cheap capital well past 1973]. But27
the high Japanese private saving rate is the factor most often cited
as applying throughout the period.
Household savina rate
The Japanese household saving rate, at 23.0 per cent of disposable
income averaged over 1970-86, is among the highest of industrialized
countries. Other figures for comparison are the U.S. 11.5, U.K.
10.4, and France The question of why the saving rate is so
high in Japan is another major topic in itself. We briefly run
through some of the arguments that have been suggested.
Hayashi (1986) claims that much of the apparent differential in
personal saving rates between Japan and the United States can be
explained by four accounting differences. But even after adjustment,
a substantial differential remains.55
At least six reasons for the high Japanese saving rate have been
given, by Hayashi and others.
(1) a high growth rate: the older dissaving generation are always
outweighed by the younger saving generation.56
(2) demographics: currently Japan has one of the longest life
expectancies and smallest ratio of aged to working—age population (15
per cent, vs. 20 per cent in the U.S. and 23 per cent over all the
OECD countries].57 Horioka (1986) has estimated that the age ratio
can explain a difference in saving rates of 11.5 per cent.58
(3) an underdeveloped social security system. There are
conflicting effects on the saving rate,59 and Horioka argues that28
they approximately cancel out.
(4) the bonus system of employee compensation: the lump—sum
payments at the end of each half-year might act as a sort of forced
saving. This would require a sort of "calendar illusion". But
Ishikawa and Ueda (1984) find that the bonus system does indeed have
an effect on saving (though they estimate it to be at most three
percentage points).
(5) the high price of land and housing.Even before recent price
increases (1985—87), housing prices in Japan were almost twice as
high as those in the United States. They are 2.5 -2.7times higher
if differences in floorspace are taken into account.6° As a result,
housing constitutes 65 per cent of saving in Japan as compared to 31
per cent in the United States.61 By itself, the saving implications
of expensive housing are not as clear as often asserted.62 But a
positive effect on saving does follow from the unavailability of
consumer credit; Hayashi, Ito and Slearod (1988) report that Japanese
have to accumulate up to 40 per cent of the purchase price as a
downpayment.63 Also, mortgage interest is not tax-deductible as it
is in the United States. Japanese appear to have a greater cultural
bias against personal indebtedness than do Americans; rather than
using credit cards to postpone payment for purchases, for example,
Japanese are fond of magnetic cards that allow them to Dre—Dav, and
then deduct purchases as they are made.64
Balassa and Noland (1988, p. 92) argue that a special combination
of high housing prices and the strategic bequest motive on the part
of the elderly are the best explanation of high saving. Horioka29
(1985, 1988) reports that, while opinion surveys in the United States
report old age as the most important motive for saving, surveys in
Japan place saving to buy a house as more important (together with
education and marriage). Horioka (1986) estimates that high land
prices explain a difference in saving rates of 5.0 per cent.65
(6) tax incentives: in the past, the tax system has deliberately
increased the after—tax return to households in a number of ways.
Japanese could escape paying taxes on much of their savings by taking
advantage of such exemptions as deposits in the maruyu system and the
postal savings system. A family of four could legally hold $455,000
in tax—free assets.66 The 1987 tax reform, effective April 1988,
abolished the tax-exempt savings accounts. But it did retain two
pro—saving features of the tax system. First, when a saver does pay
tax on interest earnings or dividends, they are taxed separately from
his income tax and at a rate lower than the top marginal rate.
Second, although the December 1988 tax reform, effective April 1989,
instated the taxation of capital gains on sales of securities (which
were previously not taxed), the tax rate is still below that or the
United States (especially since the 1986 U.S. tax reform) and other
major countries. (The saver gets his option of 5 per cent of the
value of the transaction or 20 per cent of the capital gain.67)
Although one of the reasons behind the Japanese tax reform was
foreign pressure ("gaiatsu") to make the Japanese system less pro—
saving, and therefore more like the U.S. system, the effect of this
decrease in the after—tax return on the supply of saving and
therefore on the real interest rate is not clear. In theory, the30
substitution effect and income effect go in opposite directions.
Saxonhouse (1982) believes that the Japanese are, in fact, target-
savers: because their goal is to save enough to buy a home, a
decrease in the after—tax rate of return means that they now need to
save more, not less, to achieve the same goal. In empirical studies,
a positive effect of the after—tax return on the saving rate has been
difficult to find. (For Japan, see Makin, 1985, and Hayashi, 1986.
Iwata, Suzuki and Yoshida, 1988, p.129—131, however, do find evidence
of an effect (by breaking down the tax rate and other variables by
income class].) A simulation analysis in Hayashi, Ito and Slemrod
(1988) concluded that the Japanese saving rate would go down by a few
percentage points if Japan were to abolish the maruyu, but this was
not a statistical test.68
International caDital mobility
Even if a tax reform or a land—use reform were to reduce the
Japanese level of household saving toward that in Western countries,
there is a serious further question as to whether such a change would
lower the Japanese real interest rate or the cost of capital to
firms. If capital is perfectly mobile internationally, it is argued,
then a decline in national saving should not put any upward pressure
on the rate of return within Japan, but rather should be entirely
offset by increased borrowing from abroad (and decreased lending) at
an unchanged rate of return.6931
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) initiated what has proven to be a
long-lasting debate by observing that changes in countries' rates of
national saving in fact had large effects on their rates of
investment, and interpreting the finding as evidence of low capital
mobility. The paper was subjected to many econometric attacks, but
the basic results seemed to hold up.7°
It is possible to test the international equalization of rates of
return more directly. Many studies have documented the failure of
real interest rates to be equalized across countries,71 seeming to
confirm the Feldstein-Horioka results. We saw in Section 1 that the
Japanese real interest rate has been below the U.S. rate for quite
some time, and appears to be so still. But the Japanese government
announced the removal of controls on international capital movements
in 1979—80, and further liberalization measures in 1983-84, partly in
response to pressure from the U.S.Treasury.72 Is it possible that
this announced liberalization has failed to be genuine or complete?
A number of studies have shown, using data on covered interest
differentials, that the 1979—80 and 1983—84 liberalizations did
indeed have the effects advertized.73 By now covered interest parity
holds as well for Japan (vis—a—vis the Eurodollar market) as it does
for such major countries as Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom:
the differential between the dollar interest rate and the interest
rate on domestic currency is equal to the discount on the dollar in
the forward exchange market. This finding suggests that Japan is
highly integrated into world financial markets with respect to the
movement of capital across national boundaries.32
The finding still leaves open the possibility of differences
associated with the currency in which an asset is denominated, as
opposed to the oolitical jurisdiction in which it is issued. For
example, investors' expectations that the dollar may in the future
depreciate against the yen in nominal terms almost certainly explain
why the yen interest rate is less than the dollar interestrate.74
Similarly, expectations that the dollar may depreciate against the
yen in real terms may explain why the yen real interest rate is less
than the dollar real interest rate. In that case, the Feldstein—
Horioka view is correct ——realinterest rates are not necessarily
equalized internationally and changes in saving (even if truly
exogenous) need not be offset by borrowing from abroad and thus may
be heavily reflected as changes in investment ——andyet the
explanation may be the imperfect international integration of goods
markets that allows failures of purchasing power parity, rather than
imperfect international integration of financial markets. If there
is no way of arbitraging directly among countries' goods or among
their plant and equipment, and if plant and equipment are imperfect
substitutesfor bonds within each country, then perfect international
arbitrage among countries' bonds is not sufficientto equalize real
ratesof return among countries'plant and equipment.
Lone-termreal aotreciation of the yen
It is often argued that real interest differentials and
expectationsof real depreciation exist only because of short—run33
factors such as sticky goods prices, and that they must vanish in the
long run. How then could the Japanese real interest rate remain
below the U.S. real interest rate for 30 years? One possible answer
is that capital controls prevented equalization in the l960s and
19705,76 that the differential after liberalization in the early
l980s was a transitory phenomenon, and that henceforth the
differential will be zero.
But an alternative possibility is that investors have expected the
yen to appreciate in real terms throughout the last 30 years, and
that they still do. Let us decompose the real interest differential,




where i and i* are the Japanese and U.S. nominal interest rates,
respectively, and intl and mt 1* are the Japanese and U.S. expected
inflation rates, respectively. We see that even if the expected rate
of returns on domestic and foreign bonds are equalized when expressed
in a common currency, i.e., i—i*—appr =0,there will still be a
non—zero real interest differential if there is a nonzero expected
future real appreciation of the yen (appr—infl+infl*). Expected
real changes in the exchange rate would be ruled out if purchasing
power parity held, but it is well-known by now that purchasing power
parity in fact fails to hold.
One reason to believe that there is indeed such an expectation is
that survey data show that market participants in the 1980s have34
indeed expected a rapid appreciation of the yen against the dollar.77
A second reason to believe this is that the yen has in fact
appreciated steadily against the dollar in real terms over the
postwar period. During the fixed exchange rate era, 1950 to 1973,
the yen appreciated against the dollar at an average logarithmic rate
of 3.66 per cent per year in real terms (using the two countries CPIs
to deflate). During the floating rate era, 1973 to 1989 (April], the
real appreciation of the yen has continued, at an average rate of
3.46 per cent per year. Even if one believes that the yen has
overshot its equilibrium somewhat as of (April] 1989 --andmany
economists are saying that to the contrary the yen has not
appreciated enough, to be consistent with long—term fundamentals ——
thebasic point about the trend in the real exchange rate would be
little affected. With such a strong trend in the real exchange rate
over the last 40 years, it is easy to believe that investors have
long since coma to incorporate into their long—term expectations a
real appreciation of the yen of 3 per cent per year. Thus it is easy
to believe that, even if international arbitrage drives the U.S.-
Japan interest differential to equality with expected appreciation of
the yen, that this could leave a real interest differential as large
as 3 per cent.
How could the yen appreciate steadily against the dollar in real
terms over such a long period? Many consider the tendency for
purchasing power parity to hold at least in the long run to be
virtually the most fundamental and traditional principle of35
international monetary economics. (The observed trend also violates,
to the extent that it is statistically significant, the currently-
popular hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random
walk.]
A number of explanations have been attempted for the long-term
trend in the real yen, including a relatively low elasticity of
importswithrespect to income in Japan (Krugman, 1989), and a
relatively rapid rate of productivity growth in Japanese
manufacturing (Marston, 1987). A natural explanation is the
classical observed pattern, most often attributed to Balassa (1964),
that a rapidly growing country tends (1) to experience an increase in
the price of its nontraded goods relative to its internationally
traded goods (because of higher productivity growth in the traded-
goods sector, or else because non—traded goods are superior goods in
consumption), and therefore (2) to exhibit an apparent real
appreciation of its currency when the deflation is done using CPIs
which include a large share of nontradable goods within them.
Letuslook at the real exchange rate defined in terms of
consumer price indices:
Er.ai =E(CPI* /CPI]. (3)
We will represent the CPI in each country as a weighted average of
non—traded goods and traded goods (in "Cobb—Douglas" form). We use a
and a* to represent the weights of nontraded goods in the domestic
and foreign country's price indices, respectively: _ (i—a*) ,a(l-a)
rsal n t 'nt
=[(P*/P*t)/ ] (EP*/]. (4)36
If the "law of one price" does hold for traded goods, then Pt =
andthe last bracketed term in (4) drops out:
1rs*1 =[(P*/Pet)55/(p/p)&]
Equation(5) tells us that therealexchange rate will change if the
relative price of non-traded goods changes in either the foreign
country or the domestic country, even though Purchasing Power Parity
may hold perfectly well for the tradable share.
This description sounds like it was specially designed for Japan,
where tradable goods consist primarily of manufactured, agricultural
and mineral products, and nontradables include housing, golf—club
memberships, and other services. The model in Ito (1989a) shows that
if the supply of land is inelastic in Japan and elastic in the United
States, the yen will appear to appreciate in real terms as the
economies grow (where the price of housing services is included in
the relevant CPI).
Testing the hypothesis of a change in the relative price of
nontraded goods, however, is more difficult than it might seem. Most
sectors are at least partly traded in character. Table 3 singles out
17 specific services that are fairly clearly traded and shows the
relative change in their prices in Tokyo over the period 1972 to
1987. Ten of the services, including particularly the forms of urban
transportation, went up in price more than the general CPI, and seven
78 less. This provides some support for the hypothesis, though less
than one might have expected.
There is an alternative way to view the decomposition of the
economy into traded and nontraded. virtually all sectors use at37
least some amount of internationally traded goods as intermediate
input, in production (energy, for example). At the same time,
virtually all sector. involve at least some domestic value—added
before the product in question is sold to the consumer, even if it is
only shipping, marketing and retailing. (Indeed, the amount of
resources devoted to the distribution system is thought to be
notoriously high in Japan.] It is possible that each sector has
experienced an increase in the price of nontraded value—added and
inputs relative to its traded value-added and inputs. Such a trend
would explain a real appreciation of the yen calculated with CPIs, or
even more disaggregated industry prices, even if the law of one price
held perfectly for the traded component. This hypothesis may show up
in the increasing ratio of the CPI to producer price indices or unit
labor costs in Japan. It is also relevant to the recent literature
on pricing markups for Japanese imports and exports.79 In any case,
the hypothesis bears further investigation.
Regardless whether the relative price of nontraded goods does in
fact prove the correct explanation of the real appreciation of the
yen, it is undeniable that a strong sustained trend of real
appreciation has taken place, with the implication that a real
interest differential of 2 or even 3 per cent is perfectly consistent
with highly integrated financial markets.8°
We have argued that, even if Japanese corporations are now no more
highly levered than American corporations, and even if international
arbitrage now equates the Japanese and foreign nominal interest rates38
(when expressed in a common currency), that the Japanese real
interest rate may still lie below the foreign rate. A real interest
differential (whatever its source] could in turn help explain high
price/earnings ratios in the Japanese stock market, high price/rental
ratios in the Japanese land market, and a lower cost of capital to
Japanese firms.81 But the argument about the low real interest rate
might seem to apply to the past in Japan as much as, or more than, to
the present. Similarly, the argument that the expected rate of real
economic growth in Japan is high applies to the past as much as, or
more than, to the present. How can one explain that price/earnings
ratios and price/rental ratios were not also high in the past, i.e.,
that they have risen sharply in the 1980s?
INTER}ALCORPORATE FINANCING AND RELATIONSHIPBANKING, VERSUSTHE
MARKET SYSTEM
The standard formula for the price/earnings ratio and the
price/rental ratio, i/(r—g), assumes that the real interest rate r
(or a required rate of return equal to the real interest rate marked
up by a risk premium) is relevant for discounting expected future
returns. This assumption is appropriate for economies where
corporate finance is oriented around a unified central market, i.e.,
a common pool of funds into which most savers deposit and from which
most investors draw off.82 This description applies to the United39
States, and it applies increasingly to Japan today. But it did not
apply very veil to Japan in the 1970s, and still less so in the
1960s, as Meerschwam (1989) explains at greater length.
The existence of lending by government agencies to favored firms in
favored industries at subsidized rates, and the artificial
"repression" of other interest rates through regulation and
administrative guidance, have always been major ways that Japanese
corporations have been thought to have an "unfair" cost—of—capital
advantage in the past.83 Equally familiar is the claim that large
corporations or keiretsu take profits from one activity and cross-
subsidize investment in another; but it has seldom been clear why
Japanese industry should want to do this.84
Recent theoretical developments have helped us understand better
how the cost of internal finance can be less than the cost of
external finance.85 One route is asymmetric information between the
firm's managers and the typical stockholder or bondholder in the
market regarding the rate of return on an investment; another route
is incentive or "agency" problems. "Internal finance" in the United
States would be the corporation's financing of an investment out of
retained earnings (or out of depreciation charges), as opposed to
financing at market rates by borrowing from a bank or issuing
securities.
Retained earnings are also important in Japan, important in
particular to understanding why the cost of capital remained low in
the 1970s. Ever since the Japanese economic growth rate fell of f
with the oil shock of 1973, the number of profitable investment40
projects has fallen short of the supply of funds available. (In the
national savings identity, the offset to the increase in the saving—
investment balance of the corporate sector was primarily a large
increase in the government budget deficit in the 1970s, followedby a
large increase in the current account surplus in the 1980s.) In
other words, since 1973 firms have been able to finance investments
out of retained earnings to a much greater extent than previously.
Retained earnings appear to be a cheaper source of financing than
issuing corporate debt or equity, because they get around problems of
incomplete information or incentive incompatibility.
It can be argued that in Japan "internal finance" de facto includes
as well borrowing by a firm from its main bank under a long-term
relationship. The reasoning is that the main bank, like a large
shareholder (which, in fact, it often is) can keep close tabs on what
goes on inside the firm, thus largely obviating the information and
incentive problems.86 Hodder (1988b) concludes that the advantages
of "lender monitoring" are key, and that they may explain why studies
like Ando and Auerbach (1988) find that the cost of capital is lower
in Japan than the United States.87
Empirical evidence in support of the proposition that internal and
main—bank finance are cheaper than external or market finance is
offered by some recent microeconoinic studies of the determinants of
firm investment. It has long been true that variables such as cash
flow did a better job econometrically of explaining business fixed
investment than theoretically—preferable variables such as the real
interest rate and Tobin's Q (at least when each factor was considered41
on its own].88 The new theories of information and incentive
problems, however, now provide the desired rigorous theoretical basis
for including cash flow. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) have
recently estimated regression equations for investment on a cross—
section of U.S. firms. They distinguish firms thatpay low
dividends, which they assume are liquidity—constrained, from others.
They show that cash flow is a more important determinant of
investment in the former group, which they interpret as evidence in
favor of the internal-finance hypothesis. (Tobin's Q, the ratio of
the market price of equity to replacement cost, is also included as
an explanatory variable, to capture expectations of the return to
investment.) One can interpret such findings as analogous to the
Feldstein-Horioka result: just as a high correlation of national
saving and investment across countries suggests that there may exist
some barriers that separate individual countries from the worldwide
capital market, so does high correlation of corporate saving and
investment across firms suggest that there may exist barriers that
separate individual firms from the nationwide capital market.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1988) apply a similar methodology to
Japan, where the segregation of firms can be more persuasively
accomplished. They break down a sample into two groups. One
consists of 121 "affiliated" firms, those with ties to large banks
(typically a main bank) that are part of its keiretsu. The other
consists of 25 "independent" firms, without close links to any
particular bank. They find that among the independent firms, cash
flow positively affects investment (and Tobin's Q does not], while42
among the affiliated firms cash flow has no significanteffect.89
The conclusion is that the first group faces a barrier between the
cost of financing investment out of retained earnings and the cost of
borrowing, like American firms do, while the latter can borrow from
their affiliated banks as easily as financing out of retained
earnings. The authors conclude that one possible implication is that
"the institutional arrangements in Japan may offer Japanese firms an
important competitive advantage (p.24)."
The hypothesis that internal and indirect finance (especially from
the main bank) is cheaper than direct or market finance can thus
support the claim that the true cost of capital to Japanese
corporations (at least those that are members of keiretsu) has been
low in the past. But established banking relationships have begun to
break down in Japan and the market has begun to take their place, as
corporations begin to use banks less and bond markets more, a process
that accelerated in the 1980s as the result of international
liberalization as well as domestic deregulation.90 The share of bank
lending in total external financing fell from 84 per cent in 1971-
1975, to 57 per cent in 1981—1985, as many firms found they could
borrow more easily or more cheaply on the open market. But if the
relevant interest rate was higher in the 1980s than it was in the
past, this raises some difficult questions.91 The first is how one
explains the fact that price/earnings and price/rental ratios were
lower in previous decades than today. (The second, why firms would
voluntarily abandon advantageous banking arrangements, is addressed
subsequently.]43
We must ask who would have had the opportunity to arbitragebetween
thelow "cost of capital" and the high expected future ieturn to
holding land or equities. For those who had the opportunity to buy
land, plant and equipment, or equity, the oooortunity cost o,f fujd
washigh, a number more like the observed rate of return on equit'.or
the growth rate of the economy than like the observed interest rate
or the still lower cost of internal finance.92 The individual small
investor did not have such opportunities; he was given little
alternative to depositing his savings in a low-interest-rate
account.93 The same was to a certain extent true of institutional
investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, and in any
case the pool of available savings in such institutions was far
smaller than in the 1980s. A corporation that was favored with
access to cheap loans from the government or from its main bank was
not generally free to use those funds to "speculate" in land or in
the shares of other corporations. (Nor was there much point in
buying back its own shares, when it had plenty of profitable new
projects to invest in.] Thus the arbitrage between the interest rate
and real assets that we take for granted in a market—oriented system
was not entirely relevant in the earlier period.
As noted, firms have begun to rely less on banks for their
financing, and more on marketplace borrowing, due in large part to
deregulation and internationalization. The most important
liberalizations include: the removal of ceilings on interest rates
after 1978 (in response to growing reluctance on the part of banks to44
of government debt at artificially low
interétàä]the switch to a presumption that firms were allowed
toYlb&d"toforeign residents (as part of the Foreign Exchange
Lao]in1980, the legalization of warrant bonds in 1981, the
igrfzation of non-collateralized bonds for sufficiently safe
coiporations beginning in 1983, and the liberalization of issues of
Euro-yen bonds as part of the Yen/Dollar negotiations between the
Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Treasury in l984.
Note that even for those steps that represent domestic innovation
or deregulation as opposed to international liberalization,
foreigners have been an important driving force. There has been both
direct political pressure on the Japanese government from foreign
governments and competitive pressures on Japanese financial
institutions from the activities of foreign rivals.
In a follow-up paper, Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1989) address
the gradual weakening of the links between banks and affiliated firms
that has been taking place in Japan. Choosing 1983 as the first year
in which the effects of deregulation were fully felt, they begin with
their sample of firms that had close banking ties during the period
1977-1982, and divide it into a sub-sample who shifted emphasis
thereafter from bank—borrowing to direct market finance, and a sub-
sample who continued to rely primarily on their banks; they find
that the former group developed a strong sensitivity of investment to
cash flow after 1983, while the latter group did not. This
constitutes further evidence that bank—borrowing in Japan obviates
some of the usual costs of external financing.45
Some have surmised that if public policy and the main-bank system
have kept the cost of capital artificially low in Japan in the past,
the deregulation and internationalization of Japanese financial
markets must now have eliminated that advantage. Even if we could be
confident that the Japanese cost of capital has been raised in this
manner, that would still leave open the question of whether or not
the traditional system produced a greater level of economic
efficiency for the economy overall. On the one hand, any way of
obviating information or incentive problems must represent a gain.
On. the other hand, the exclusion of certain firms and certain
industries from the privileges of cheaper financing is only
beneficial if there exists some decision—making mechanism superior to
the market to decide who is worthy of inclusion and who is not, a
questionable proposition.
It is also possible that the previous system of denying Japanese
savers, banks, and taxpayers, an opportunity to earn an equilibrium
rate of return on their savings, even if inefficient in the
economists' sense that it failed to maximize intertemporal welfare,
nevertheless produced an (artificially) high level of investment.
Such a proposition would be consistent with the legendary Japanese
corporate emphasis on maximizing market share at theshort—run
expense of current profits.95 An alternative line of argument,
adopted by Krugman, Hatsopoulos and Summers (1988), is that the U.S.
market system produces an inefficiently low level of investment
because of excessive concern with short—term profits and capital
gains, at the expense of longer—term investmentopportunities.9646
Perhaps the United States has recently succeeded in "dragging the
Japanese down to our level."
In any case, a puzzle remains. If the effective cost of capital
under the traditional system is less than the market interest rate
under the new system, why are Japanese firms voluntarily giving up
their advantageous main—banking relationships for the difficulties of
the marketplace? fodder (l988b) concludes that if firms are leaving
their main bank relationships, it must be because it is advantageous
to do so, though he also concludes that it must have been
advantageous for them to enter into these relationships in the first
place.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1989) suggest a possible explanation
to the paradox: there are hidden costs to the system of bank
monitoring, and a cheaper way of overcoming the information and
incentive obstacles to borrowing —-whichis available only to older,
well-established, successful firms -—isto take advantage of the
firm's reputation by issuing highly—rated bonds.97 The alternative
possibility is that the change is not desirable from the viewpoint of
the well-established firms. There is little evidence that banks and
other financial institutions are supplying less credit to their
domestic clients (or offering less favorable terms), and instead
taking advantage of the higher interest rates in the United States by
lending abroad. Still, it may not be possible for trust and long-
term relationships to survive in an environment where new—corners deal
only in explicit contracts.
Even under this theory, which agrees that the typical keiretsu firm47
may face a higher cost of capital now that in the past, the
deregulation and internationalization of Japanese financial markets
over the last ten years is advantageous to one group of firms: those
that never had access to preferential financing from main banks or
government agencies in the past. While small firms lack the
reputation necessary to borrow abroad, there are many large and
medium—sized firms that were never members of keiretsu or favored by
the government, and had little means of financing expansion before
the advent of free financial markets. For this group,
internationalization has probably lowered the cost of capital,
whether they now finance themselves by issuing bonds in the
Euromarket or in newly—liberalized domestic markets.
Of the conclusions of this paper, those that are perhaps novel are
that (1) it is possible that the real interest rate in Japan remains
below that in the United States, despite international arbitrage, and
that (2) the main relevant effect of the internationalization in
Japan may have been to accelerate the process whereby corporate
finance becomes market—oriented, so that (3) affiliated firms are
losing the special privilege of borrowing at a cheaper rate, while
(4) unaffiliated firms are now able to borrow more cheaply than
before, at the going interest rate, and (5) the increased
availability of funds that can be used for asset-market arbitrage
allowed the great run-up in equity prices and land prices in the
l980s.48
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Tokyo CPI (pre—war base) 2.47
national CPI 2.45
*source: Iwata and Yoshida (1988, p.510).
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1. For example, by Balassa and Noland (1988, p.113).
2. (If Japanese financial markets have indeed been evolving
toward a single economy—wide cost of capital, this number is not
necessarily higher than the cost of capital that faced even
favored keiretsu firms in the past. Possible reasons are given
later in the paper.]
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(1983).
4. For example, Hatsopoulos and Brooks (1986) and, especially,
Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Summers (1988).
5. The three-way breakdown has been calculated by Friend and
Tokutsu (1987), among others.
6. The charts are borrowed from an uncirculated paper by Lawler,
Loopesko and Dudey (1988). (Chart 1 may understate the Japanese
real interest rate in the 1970s, both because the actual
inflation rates that are used overstate expected inflation rates
and because the government bond rates that are used were too low
to be willingly absorbed by private investors.]
7. Lawler, Loopesko and Dudey (1988, 26) show real interest rates
on Japanese 1—year government bonds that have been below U.S.
yields during virtually the entire 1965—1988 period. (This paper
not ready for circulation.] Friend and Tokutsu find that the
real cost of debt, weighted between short—term and long—term, was
.80 per cent lower in Japan than the U.S. on average over the
period 1962—1984 (1.70 lower over the period 1970—1984].
8. The increase in the U.S. real interest differential from 1981
to mid-1984 is often credited with much of the explanation for
the contemporaneous appreciation of the dollar. The differential
vis—a—vis the real interest rate in Japan was no larger than vis-
a—vis Germany and some other countries. But then the movement of
the dollar against the yen was actually less than against the
mark and other major European currencies (contrary to widespread
impression), and actually peaked in 1982 rather than February
1985.
9. One of many possible references on the capital inflow that
resulted from the shift in the U.S. monetary/fiscal mix in the
1980s is Frankel (1988a). References on the forces behind the
inflow from Japan in particular are given in Frankel (1988b).
10. .58 according to French and Poterba, 1989, p.40 (average of
first quarters of 1986, 1987 and 1988); they use long-term
government bond yields, minus previous year's inflation rate.58
11. On August 23, 1989, the nominal interest differential between
the United States and Japan was 3.3 % for 10-year government bond
yields, 3.5 % for one—year Eurocurrency rates, and 5.6% for bank
prime lending rates. A survey of forecasters conducted byAlan
Teck on that day put the difference in expected inflation rates
at 2.5 per cent for the 10-year horizon (4.75 % in the U.S.,
versus 2.25 % in Japan) and 2.6 % for the one-year horizon.
(Currency Forecasters' Digest, White Plains, N.Y., Sept.1989.)
The CPI inflation differential was 3.3 % in 1988 and 2.0 % in the
first 5 months of 1989.(fl'IF data.]
12. The formula also works for firms' dividend/price ratio, again
with the growth rate properly defined.
13. A similar point is made by French and Poterba (1989, p.19).
However, they conclude that, while a lower real rate of interest
in Japan might be able to explain the high level of Japanese
stock prices on averaae during their sample period (the 19705 and
1980s), it cannot explain the increase during the last three
years, 1986—88.
14. The apparent conclusion that a firm can lower its cost of
capital by increasing the weight on debt would only hold if the
cost of equity could be assumed to be independent (whereas it
might in fact be expected to rise as the firms levered beta
rises).
15. E.g., Abegglen (1985), Crum and Meerschwam (1987) or
Meerschwam (1989).
16. On the so—called recession cartels, see Yamamura (1982) and
Meerschwam (1989, p.17).
17. Other reasons have been given as well why a given corporate
balance sheet that might spell excessive risk in the United
States would not be as worrisome in Japan. For example, Abegglen
(1985, 165) argues in this connection that a typical Japanese
firm does not consolidate the financial assets held by its
subsidiaries into its ownbalancesheet ——wherea corresponding
U.S. firm might do so —-andcarries land and securities on its
books at original cost. (But the fact that much of Japanese
equity is held by other firms, so that the total amount of equity
in Japan is not as large as appears on the books, seems like a
reason why Japanese debt/equity ratios might be understated.]
Some of these accounting questions are discussed under the
heading of price/earnings ratios below.
18. Since 1986, actually falling to half the U.S. level in an
estimate for 1988 (according to French and Poterba (1989, p.8 and
Table 4)].59
19. C.Baldwin computes a risk—return frontier for each country
and finds little difference between the two; i.e., the level of
expected return for any given level of risk is similar. Ando and
Auerbach (1985) is based on a fairly small sample of firms (for
the period 1966-1981). (In addition to their calculation of the
average rates of return, they also look at earnings/price ratios,
discussed below.]
20. They found that the before—tax returns were 6.5 per cent in
Japan, versus 12.3 per cent in the United States. (After-tax
returns were 2.5 per cent versus 5.6 per cent.) The time period
was 1967—83.
21. Also this approach amounts to looking at the problem from
the viewpoint of the market investor, rather than the firm. The
two do not necessarily face the same cost of funds. Hodder
(1988b) dissents from the Ando and Auerbach approach on these
grounds. We save until later the argument that firms may have
acàess to some funds that are cheaper than the expected rate of
return on capital (that internal financing is cheaper than both
the cost of debt and the cost of equity].
22. Free Cash Flow is defined as profit after tax, minus changes
in working capital, minus other capital spending, plus
depreciation. (More of earnings go to net investment in Japan
than in the United States.]
23. Minimum dividend-payout rates were established in the early
19708 (Meerschwam, 1989).
24. Lawler, Loopesko and Dudey (1988, 25) point out that the
Japanese rate of growth of earnings per share need not be
correlated with the rate of growth of the Japanese economy. On
the other hand, dividends would appear to be one step further
removed than are earnings, via the (difficult to determine)
procedure whereby firms set their payout rates.
25. When Ando and Auerbach apply a corresponding correction for
their measure of total return to capital, on the other hand, they
find that the median rate for Japan falls more than that for the
U.S..
26. Apparently the fact that the inflation rate is lower in Japan
has less of an effect than the higher debt/equity ratio.
27. There is a fourth possibility, that the "equity premium"
(defined as the expected rate of return on equity minus the
interest rate) is smaller for Japan, which would in theory
require that the Japanese stock market be less risky than the
American stock market. Ueda (1989, 12-13) argues that the risk
premium in the Japanese stock market declined sharply between
1982 and 1988, but can find little evidence of a corresponding60
decline in riskiness. Lawler, Loopesko and Dudey (1988, 26-27)
conclude that uncertainty in the two stock markets was roughly
similar in the late 19805 (despite some possible differences in
the past), whether estimated from the standard deviations of
monthly changes or expected volatilities implicit in stockindex
options. (As already noted, studies such as Baldwin (1986)claim
to find no sign that the expected rate of return on Japanese
securities is lower, even for a given amount of risk.]
28. Hale (1987, p.1).
29. Shoven (1989). See also Noguchi(1985).
30. The paper treats separately the possibility that favorable
treatment of saving in the Japanese tax system has been one of
the causes of high household saving in Japan. This effect, if it
existed, would operate via a low real interest rate.
31. Consistent with the findings of Shoven and Tachibanaki
(1988).
32. They artificially boost the U.S. real interest rate for the
1970s up a bit, because it was in fact observed to be negative,
which would "wreak havoc" with the methodology that they adopt to
evaluate tax systems (from King and Fullerton.]
33. The tax rate on undistributed profits during the period 1984
to 1987 was 43.3 per cent. (Homma, Maeda and Hashimoto, 1986,
p.14., and Homma, 1987, p.21.) However, it had been lover in the
19505 and 1960s, ranging from 35 per cent to 40 per cent. (Homma
et al, 1984, p.124, Table 2.39, and Shoven and Tachibanaki, 1988,
Table 3.6.)
34. When state and local taxes on corporations are added in, the
Japanese rate is about 50 per cent and the U.S. rate about 40 per
cent. These numbers are taken from Shoven (1988). (One of
several motives for the Japanese tax reform is that the Ministry
of Finance fears that, in the absence of international
harmonization of corporate tax rates, business would increasingly
be able to find ways to arbitrage across tax jurisdictions.)
35. Recall the figures from French and Poterba that by 1988 the
debt/equity ratio in Japan had fallen below that in the United
States. Noguchi (1985, p. 9, 18) lists the fall in the
debt/equity ratio is one of several reasons why the tax burden on
Japanese investment increased in the late 197 Os and early 1980s
[though, like Ando and Auerbach, Noguchi thinks that the Japanese
burden has been higher than the U.S. burden all along]. The most
important of the reasons (as with Shoven] is the fall in the
inflation rate.6].
36. Takenaka (1986) concludes that the impact of the investment
tax credit on Japanese investment is negligible.
37. In addition to the U.S. tax reform of 1986 (which rolled back
investment incentives for U.S. firms), the Japanese tax reforms
that took effect in April of 1988 and April of 1989 raised the
tax rate on Japanese saving in a number of ways (besides changing
the corporate tax system in a way that would evidently would
leave Ando and Auerbach (1985) and Shoven in disagreement as to
the sign of the effect on investment incentives). The previously
existing pro—saving bias in the Japanese tax system, compared to
the American system, constituted part of the difference in "tax
wedges" computed by Bernheim and Shoven (1986). It is discussed
below, under the topic of determinants of the real interest rate
in Japan.
38. Hale (1989) opines that thedramaticreversal of the rankings
of.U.S. and Japanese capitalization over the course of the l980s
represents the financial market's negative judgment on
Reaganomics, as compared to policy-making by bureaucrats in the
Japanese Ministry of Finance. But when Murphy (1989) observes
the same reversal, he worries that Japan's policy—makers are not
ready to accept the responsibility of greater weight in the
world.
39. Which they usually carry on their books, not at current
market price, but at the price of acquisition (which, in the case
of land held since the 19th century, is essentially zero).
40. Ueda (1989, p.7), however, computes the ratio of the market
value of corporate shares to the value of corporate assets and
concludes that, "according to this result land prices are not a
major factor in the recent rise in stock prices."
41. Iwata and Yoshida (1988, p.509).
42. Ito (1989a).
43. In 1984, the value of land in Japan was 3.17 times GNP, while
in the U.S. it was only .80 times GNP. (Sachs and Boone, 1988.)
44. For example, Boone and Sachs (1989).
45. About five times higher than London. Boone (1989, 47)
estimates that the price of land in Tokyo is 150 times that in
New York, despite little difference in rental rates on apartments
and buildings.
46. There are a number of special institutional features that
affect the Japanese land market, such as building height
restrictions, special protection for rice paddies, and a level of
taxation of capital gains at the time of sale that is much62
greater than annual property taxes. Some of these can be viewed
as contributing to the inelasticity of the supply of land.
47. Limiting the supply of space, in addition to geography, are
land-use restrictions such as building-height limitations and
"sunshine laws."
48. The price of land alone went up even more than the price of
housing over this same period. [The price/rental ratio for land
increased by 14 per cent between 1975 and 1986 (27 per cent in
the three big cities).] The source is Iwata and Yoshida (1988,
p. 510).
49. Ito's theory may, however, give us a reason why land
price/rental ratios in Japan should be higher than in the United
States. Ito shows that if the supply of available land increases
at the growth rate of the economy, then the relative price of
land will be constant. In terms of the equation, if the supply
of land is more elastic in the United States than in Japan, then
gr will be lower and therefore Pld/rent will be lower in the U.S
50. The Ministry of Finance began to look after the stability of
the Japanese stock market after a crash in 1965. Takagi (1989)
discusses the history and institutional features of the market.
51. Lawler, Loopesko and Dudey (1988, 3 1-33) and Murphy (1989).
52. Andthatthe apparent implications for the real interest
differential and international capital flows vis—a—vis the United
States were greatly exacerbated by the U.S. fiscal expansion of
the early 1980s.
53. Indeed, Balassa and Noland (1988, p. 84) report that the
Japanese corporate sector was in surplus in the years 1974—77,
although others show only a declining deficit (where both
financial and nonfinancial corporations are included; Lincoln,
1988, Table 3—2, pp.76—77].
54. Blade (1988, p.18).
55. According to Blades (1988, p.18-19), adjusting for consumer
durables in 1986 raises the U.S. household gross saving ratio
from 11.5 % to 22.1 %,whileonly raising the Japanese ratio from
21.2% to 25.8 %.(Whenthe saving ratios are averaged over 1970-
1986, adjusting raises the U.S. ratio to 23.6 % and the Japanese
ratio to 26.1%.] See also Balassa and Noland (1988, p.80—96).
Takayama et al (1988) go so far as to say, on the basis of
several accounting corrections, that the Japanese saving rate is
not high at all.
56. As in the life—cycle hypothesis of Franco Modigliani.63
57. Over the next 30 years, Japan will go from having the highest
ratio of working age population to elderly out of the G5
countries (5.9 in 1985) to the lowest (2.3 in 2020); Shoven
(1989). A simulation by Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann and
Nicolletti (1989, 117), based on the rapid ageing of the Japanese
population, predicts that the national saving rate in Japan will
decline from 22 per cent (close to Germany's], to a minimum of 1
per cent, over the period 1990 to 2028 (falling below the U.S.
national saving rate in the year 2020].
58. An additional possible explanation --noton standard lists - - forthehighsaving rate in Japan is that it is the only non-
nuclear country of the G-5. Slemrod (1986) points out that a
higher perceived threat of nuclear annihilation should reduce
people's saving rate by reducing their expected horizons, and
offers supporting evidence from U.S. time series.
59. On the one hand low Social Security benefits encourage
workers to save more, but on the other it encourages them to
retire early.
60. Horioka (1988, p.218).
61. Frankel (1988b, fn 33).
62. Sachs and Boone (1988) construct a model to answer the
question what would happen to saving if land prices fell, in
response, for example, to the sorts of measures often urged on
Japan by Americans: the ending of prohibitions on rice imports
and the liberalization of land-use restrictions. Their model
predicts that saving would rise rather than fall, due to the fall
in wealth. Similarly, Shibuya (1988) estimates that the wealth
effect would nearly eliminate any positive effects of land prices
on saving; and Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) show that the
estimated positive effect of higher land prices on saving by
future home—buyers may be more—than—offset by estimated
reductions in saving on the part of those who abandon plans ever
to buy a home.
63. Horioka (1988, p.219) reports that Japanese families 1an
downpayment ratios of 45 to 55 percent,but that actual
downpayments are as low as 20 per cent. He argues that an
increase in the availability of mortgage credit would not
increase total saving, but would only result in a combination of
lower pre—purchase saving (to make the downpayment] and higher
post-purchase saving (to pay off the loan] (p.229).
64. Arguing against the idea that Japanese are culturally pre-
disposed to save more is the fact that the high saving rates are
only a phenomenon of the post—war era (as. pointed out by Hale
(1987, p.26) and Balassa and Noland (1988, p.81)]. Also
sometimes listed as reasons for high saving rates in Japan are64
obstacles to consumption such as the inefficient retailing
system, the lack of space in living quarters for consumer
durables, and the lack of leisure time in the work—schedule.
(See, for example, Balassa and Noland, p.94.) But economic
theory is dubious as to the implications for the saving rate of
institutional impediments that apply to future consumption as
much as to current consumption. (Wealth is only of use to the
household to the extent that it is consumed sooner or later.]
65. Hale (1987, p. 27) believes that "Any set of structural
reforms which reduce the price of housing while increasing the
tax incentive to own it could have a more dramatic effect on
savings and consumption than many policies seemingly targeted on
savings behavior itself."
66 •Thefigure is from Shaven (1989). Furthermore, many
households held more tax—free accounts than the number to which
they were legally entitled; the total number of accounts in the
postal savings system was said to be twice the population.
67. Ministry of Finance (1988); Shaven (1989).
68. So far, there has apparently been no sign of a significant
decrease in the household saving rate in Japan since the April
1988 abolishment of the maruyu. (It should be noted that the
latest tax reform also instituted a sales tax ——indeedthis was
its politically most controversial feature -—whichcould in
theory have either a positive or negative effect on the
saving/consumption decision, depending particularly on whether
households believe that the government will raise the sales tax
rate in the future.)
69. However it is fairly clear that such a decrease in saving
would reduce the Japanese current account surplus ——andall the
more so if capital is highly mobile --whichis what many
Americans want.
70. The "saving-retention" coefficient finally began to decline
in the 1980s however, according to the latest studies: Feldstein
and Bacchetta (1989) and Frankel (1989). The latter paper
contains 65 references on the subject (many of them
demonstrations that one can have a high correlation between
saving and investment despite perfect capital mobility).
71. For example, Mishkin (1984). Glick (1987) applies to Japan
and other Pacific countries in particular.
72. The story of the U.S. Treasury campaign for the
liberalization of Japanese financial markets, which began in
1983, is told in Frankel (1984).65
73. Otani and Tiwari (1981), Frankel (1984, 1988, 1989), Eken
(1984) and Ito (1986).
74. The interest differential could in theory be explained by
either of two terms (after the possibility of a covered interest
differential, or political premium, has been eliminated], both of
them associated with the currency: expected depreciation or an
exchange risk premium. The possible exchange risk premium
between the dollar and yen is examined by Fukao and Okuba (1984),
Fukao (1987), Frankel and Froot (1987), Ito (1988), and Frankel
(1988).
75. The real appreciation of the dollar against the yen and
European currencies beginning in 1981 was widely considered an
example of Dornbusch "overshooting" caused by shifts in monetary
or fiscal policy: the real exchange rate change would disappear
over time as U.S. traded—goods prices adjusted downward in
response to excess supply and Japanese traded—goods prices
adjusted upward in response to excess demand.
76. One problem with identifying capital controls as the source
of the U.S. Japan real interest differential throughout the 1970s
is that during the period 1976-1978, when the covered interest
differential was the largest in absolute magnitude, the nominal
interest in Tokyo was above the yen interest rate in the London
Euromarket, demonstrating that controls were acting to discourage
capital inflow, not outflow, at least at the short-term end of
the spectrum.
77. Frankel and Froot (1987), Ito (l989b), and Froot and Ito
(1988).
78. The source is the Bank of Japan. If the price of housing
and the rental rate are added to the list, then the number
increasing faster than the CPI is 12 out of 21. (The answers are
the same regardless whether the Tokyo CPI is used (Management and
Coordination Agency (pre-war base)] or a national CPI (IFS].]
79. On pricing—to—market by Japanese firms, see Branson and
Marston (1989), Froot (1988), Marston (1989) and Ohno (1989).
80. One must note, however, that if "the" real interest rate is
lower in Japan than the United States only because of an expected
rate of real appreciation of the yen in terms of a basket of
goods that includes non-traded goods, this does not in a
meaningful way reduce the cost of capital for a firm producing
traded goods.
81. Note, however, that if the explanation for the real interest
differential lies in an expected rate of increase in the relative
price of nontraded goods, then it can only explain high equity
prices or a low cost of capital within the nontraded aoods66
sectors.
82.(Not. that this does not preclude some firms having projects
with rates of return greater than the market rate or internal
funding sources at costs less than the market rate; it requires
only that the market rate be the marginal cost of funds for most
firms.]
83. Of twelve government financial institutions --whichas
recently as 1980 supplied 17 per cent of funds for investment in
plant and equipment --theJapan Development Bank and the Small
Business Finance Corporation were particularly notable in
channeling subsidized investment funds to selected industries
(Lee,1988,p.25-36). The more general low-interest rate policy
of the government before 1973 was explicit (for example, Tamura,
1987).
84. Abegglen and Stalk (1985), Gerlach (1987) and Hodder and
Tschoegl (1985). If the investment is expected to be profitable
in the long run, then it should be made in a market—oriented
financial system such as the U.S., with the investment funded by
borrowing in the market if necessary, as readily as under the
Japanese system.
85. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1987) in the macroeconomic
literature, and Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen and Meckling
(1976) in the finance literature. The first two focuson
information costs, the last on incentive problems.
86. For example, CrumandMeerschwam (1986), Hamada and Horiuchi
(1987), Hodder (1988a,b), and Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein
(1989a,b). Japanese financial institutions (including not just
banks, but also life insurance companies and other institutional
investors), unlike their U.S. counterparts, are allowed to take
large debt equity positions in the same firm; Prowse (1989)
argues that this difference constitutes in itself a way that the
Japanese system is better able to circumvent agency problems.
87. His argument is that the advantages of lender monitoring may
show up in part as low reported earnings/price ratios because
banksreceive payments for their services in the form of
"compensating balances" and transactions fees, which come out of
reportedcorporate earnings (rather than in theform of interest
payments).On the general point that the apparent cost of
borrowingisunderstated in Japan by the requirement of
compensating balances, see, e.g., Bronte (1982, p. 17).
88. For example, Jorgenson (1971) and Meyer and Kuh(1957).
89. Hayashi and Inoue (1989) find that q is significantly related
to firm growth, and that much, though not all, of the power of
cash flow to explain investment in a cross-section of Japanese67
firms disappears when correcting for the endogeneity of cash
flow. They do not segregate affiliated and non-affiliated firms.
90. CrumandMeerschwam (1986) and Meerschwam (1989), for
example, discuss the decline of "relationship banking," and its
replacement by the market.
91. Despite the diminished importance of subsidized government
lending and the main bank system, the era of cheaper capital
through internal finance was prolonged past 1973 in Japan by the
greater availability of retained earnings when the number of
profitable investment projects that needed to be financed
diminished. The share of funds coming from internal finance
narrowly—defined (retained earnings and depreciation charges), as
opposed to external finance (securities—issues and borrowings),
rose from 32.9 per cent in the period 1970—74 to 46.3 per cent in
the period 1975-78, and stayed in that neighborhood subsequently
(1979—85). (The source is Tamura, 1987, p.3.) It is the changes
of the 1980s that need explaining.
92. When markets in government bonds and other instruments did
begin to develop, especially in the 1970s, the observed interest
rate was presumably somewhere between the low cost of internal
and subsidized finance and the high rate of return to physical
investment.
93. As noted in Meerschwam (1989), only pre-existing shareholders
received advantageous new—share subscription rights.
94. Shinkai (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1989), Crum
and Meerschwam (1986), Feldman (1986), Frankel (1984), Sakakibara
and Kondoh (1984), and Suzuki (1987), among many other sources.
95. For example, Abegglen and Stalk (1985), CrumandMeerschwam
(1986) and Meerschwam (1989).
96. McKinnon (1989) argues that excessively short investment
horizons in the United States (in contrast to Japan) are
attributable to high interest rates, which are in turn
attributable to the risk of dollar depreciation against the yen
under the floating exchange rate system. Stein (1989) offers a
theory with more rigorous foundations.
97. It is noteworthy that agencies to rate the creditworthiness
of corporations (the analogues of Moody's or Standard and Poor's]
did not develop in Japan until recently.